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Why We Should Stop Creating Pets 
with Lives Worth Living
ABSTRACT
Pedigreed breeding often leads to severe health problems for, say, 
those dogs who exist as a result of the practice. It is also the case 
that virtually all of those unhealthy animals would not exist at all if 
it were not for the practice of pedigreed breeding. If those animals 
have lives worth living, then it follows that they are not harmed by 
the practice—assuming that a life worth living is better than no life 
at all. It would seem, then, that the standard account of harm can-
not account for the wrongness of our intentionally creating pets with 
lower welfare. I argue that there is an overlooked aspect of harm that, 
when coupled with our responsibilities as animal caretakers, entails 
that we ought to cease the practice of pedigreed breeding for the sake 
of future pets, even if many actual pets are not made worse off by the 
practice.
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I. Background
Breeding pedigreed pets often leads to severe health prob-
lems for those animals. These health problems can greatly in-
hibit normal functioning, such as mobility and breathing, and 
they often carry significant risk of shortened and painful lives. 
But what should we do with this knowledge? Many believe 
that this sort of selective breeding is morally wrong because 
it is harmful to our pets. However, closer analysis reveals a 
strong argument for the claim that these pets are not harmed. 
I argue that pedigreed breeding is in fact morally wrong—and 
indeed harmful—but that to arrive at that conclusion we must 
first supplement the standard account of harm by establishing 
our responsibility to generalizable others.
I focus on pedigreed breeding of purebred animals because 
a reduction of genetic variation as a result of generations of 
inbreeding is a common effect of this practice (Dobson 2013; 
Gough & Thomas 2010). However, the reduction in genetic 
variation is what motivates the moral concern in this paper, 
not breeding per se. So insofar as certain types of breeding do 
not increase the risk of health problems due to lack of genetic 
variation, my argument will not apply to those. And insofar 
as any non-pedigree-focused practices increase that risk, my 
argument will apply. Consider for a moment, Sadie, my fam-
ily’s Golden Retriever. Sadie was adopted from a breeder as a 
puppy. She was well-loved and well-cared for. She lived into 
canine old age, and then she passed away. Sadie was a result 
of pedigreed breeding, but she was clearly not harmed by her 
existence. Yet her breeders did risk harming her, given that they 
could not have known that she would not suffer from her lack 
of genetic variation. And one might now ask: what about the 
dogs who do encounter serious health problems as a result of 
their breeding? Suppose Sadie had been diagnosed with severe 
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hip dysplasia resulting from her genetic makeup at age two and 
had to spend the rest of her life crippled and in significant pain. 
Though we would now intuitively think that Sadie had been 
harmed, it turns out, actually, to be difficult to justify that claim 
of harm. So let us now turn to the definition of ‘harm’ and the 
challenges it poses. 
To make claims of harm, we commonly rely on the com-
parative account of harm. On this account, to harm someone is 
to make that person worse off than she otherwise would have 
been. This account is simple, neat, and fits nicely with our intu-
itions in most cases. If I sneak into your house and stab you in 
your sleep, I have harmed you on this account because I have 
caused pain and injury where otherwise you would have been 
relatively intact. However, if a doctor cuts you open while you 
are under anesthesia to perform surgery and remove a malig-
nant tumor, she has made you better off than you otherwise 
would have been, despite the pain of surgery, and thus has not 
harmed you.
But what does this account entail for a dog who has been 
intentionally bred with a lack of genetic variation due to breed 
standards and is now suffering from some drastic health prob-
lem as a result? Given that the health problem is inextricably 
tied to the animal’s genetic makeup, this particular animal 
could not exist without this problem. Therefore, if we aim to 
make a comparative claim of harm, we can only compare this 
animal’s existence to no life at all. And in that case, as long as 
that dog has a life worth living, then no particular health prob-
lem or defect constitutes a harm to that animal. 
This should give us pause, because even though there might 
be plenty of cases wherein the presence of certain health prob-
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lems seems clearly preferable to no life at all, we are likely still 
inclined to resist the conclusion that it is perfectly acceptable 
to knowingly and willingly create animals who will suffer the 
negative effects of serious health problems—especially when 
we have the means to greatly reduce this health risk. Thus, 
the comparative account of harm is clearly not equipped, as 
it stands, to handle the unique wrongs found in many creation 
cases. These cases are known as “non-identity” cases, and they 
present us with a very interesting challenge—how to account 
for harm when no one is made worse off. I will show that when 
it is our job to care for those whose existence and welfare levels 
are in our hands, a morally relevant sense of harm arises, and 
distinct moral obligations emerge.
II. Non-identity and the Comparative Account of 
Harm
So, what do we owe to those who do not yet exist, and who 
might never exist due directly to our choices? I argue that we 
are obligated to increase the welfare of future moral subjects 
to whom we bear certain kinds of responsibility, regardless of 
their particulars. I assume, of course, that our pets are moral 
subjects, and here I examine the ethical and non-identity re-
lated considerations within the practice of breeding. My argu-
ment applies to breeders, but it also applies to those simply 
selecting, say, a dog. For, how frequently we choose breeders’ 
dogs determines how frequently they breed litters. Historically, 
we have bred dogs to be dependent on humans and to express 
traits that are non-optimal to survival and flourishing—often 
mere aesthetic preferences or capabilities to meet obsolete 
needs. This has led to the aforementioned diminished genetic 
variation within breeds and created significant health problems 
for our pets. Though the individual Golden Retriever or Dachs-
hund might be a wonderful pet with a life worth living, this 
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decent welfare cannot justify pedigreed breeding. The practice 
of pedigreed breeding in general fills the office of ‘our pets’ 
with many animals who ultimately suffer from health problems 
that our pets would not have had given more cross-breeding 
and genetic variation. To be clear, an “office” in this sense is 
an abstract entity that can be filled by moral subjects and may 
be overseen by moral agents. We ought to think carefully about 
our moral obligations when we fill such offices. We created this 
dependent set of moral subjects, and we are now aware of the 
negative effect that breeding has on purebred pets in general. 
Therefore, we have a specific responsibility as pet caretakers 
to create pets who will be, on balance, healthier, and who will 
have higher welfare by ceasing the practice of pedigreed breed-
ing – even though this means that certain perfectly happy pets 
will never come into existence.
I will focus here on dogs because pedigreed breeding among 
canines is far more widespread and commonly accepted than 
pedigreed breeding of other animals, though my argument ap-
plies to any purebred pet or potential moral subject who could 
suffer due to our knowingly and willingly increasing the risk 
of health problems that result from a lack of genetic variation. 
For example, many agree that it is morally impermissible for 
siblings to procreate. The lack of genetic variation in the result-
ing child would greatly increase the risk of serious defects in 
that child. Minimizing risks of harm seems pro tanto morally 
advisable, especially if the harm would occur to a subject who 
is under your care. But, as we have seen, there is a catch when it 
comes to harm and non-identity cases. So, let us now begin this 
analysis by looking at a particular case containing the features 
of the non-identity problem. (This problem was made famous 
by Derek Parfit, who presented a case involving a 14 year old 
girl whose child has had a bad start in life but nonetheless has a 
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life worth living (Parfit 1984,: 358). The following presentation 
and analysis of the problem are taken directly from an earlier 
article (Haramia 2013) in which I argue for the relevance of de 
dicto harm in creation cases involving human persons).
To qualify as a non-identity case, the scenario in question 
must have the following characteristics, which I call Identity 
Determination and Welfare Determination:
Identity Determination: The act in question must deter-
mine the identity of the subject in question.
Welfare Determination: The act in question must pre-
dictably affect the overall welfare of the subject in 
question.
The non-identity problem is usually cashed out in terms of 
humans or persons, so, to illustrate these characteristics in fa-
miliar terms, let us look at the following case:
Sarah: Sarah decides to become a mother. She goes to the 
doctor and the doctor tells her two things. One: if she conceives 
immediately, she will give birth to a child with a serious birth 
defect—call this child “Trig”. The particular defect does not 
matter, although one should keep in mind that it is serious, but 
not so severe that it makes the child’s life not worth living. 
Two: if she waits and takes a tiny pill every day for two months, 
she will conceive and give birth to a perfectly healthy child—
call him “Track”. So, her options are (1) to conceive Trig now 
with a defect and lower welfare than the child she otherwise 
would have conceived or (2) conceive perfectly healthy Track 
later with higher welfare (but with the added inconvenience of 
repeatedly having to take a pill). She chooses option (1).
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By choosing option (1), does Sarah do something wrong? 
Many agree that she indeed does something wrong by know-
ingly and willingly conceiving a child with a serious defect 
when she could have easily conceived a perfectly healthy child. 
In fact, our first intuition is often that she has harmed her future 
child, but a closer analysis undermines this intuition. Despite 
appearances, if Sarah conceives Trig, Sarah does not thereby 
harm Trig. Trig has a life worth living, and, importantly, Trig 
has not been made worse off than he otherwise would have 
been. The alternative is that he does not exist at all. If we as-
sume that existence is not positively worse than non-existence 
for Trig, then we will conclude that Sarah does not harm Trig 
by conceiving him instead of Track. In fact, she might benefit 
him because his life is worth living. And since Track is not 
conceived, it is impossible that he is harmed in this scenario be-
cause he never exists to be harmed. Furthermore, Sarah avoids 
the inconvenience of taking a pill for two months. Thus, no 
one is harmed, and on some accounts, Sarah and Trig are actu-
ally benefited. It would seem, then, that Sarah has done noth-
ing wrong. There is a very clear parallel between these sorts 
of cases and cases involving our pets, to which I will turn in a 
moment. 
III. The De Dicto Supplement to the Comparative 
Account of Harm
I would like first to note that there are a myriad of proposed 
solutions to the questions of harm and wrongness raised by 
non-identity cases. While many solutions give rise to more 
problems than they solve, many others contain rich and inter-
esting analyses of non-identity concerns. While it is beyond the 
scope of this paper to provide an account of these important 
proposed solutions to the problem, I do want to note that it 
is likely that a solution to the non-identity problem is over-
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determined. My analysis does not preclude the importance of 
other viable analyses, but it does, I believe, uncover very im-
portant moral considerations of responsibility that are clearly 
applicable to standard non-identity cases, and to pet guardian 
cases in particular. Because my argument relies on claims of 
our responsibilities as caretakers (and not as, say, consumers), 
I restrict my conclusions to cases of pet companions and not 
other cases of animal breeding. 
To continue this analysis, let us think carefully about how we 
ought to be referring to the subjects in these non-identity cases 
so that we may discover what I claim to be overlooked aspects 
of harm. Up to now, we have been working with two possible 
referents of Sarah’s ‘future child’: (1) Track, the person who 
would exist if Sarah takes the pills and (2) Trig, the (other) per-
son who would exist if Sarah does not take the pills.  (1) and (2) 
are both de re referents. That is, they mean to refer to the actual 
individuals who would come into existence if a given course 
of action were taken. This is the de re sense, which literally 
translated means “of the thing.” The de re referent is the thing 
you can point to, and it has very determinate physical proper-
ties. In the Sarah case, under the de re interpretation, no actual 
individual is harmed by Sarah’s choice. No one we can point to 
has a legitimate complaint of having been made worse off. But 
this is not the only relevant interpretation.
There is a third possible referent in these cases. This is the de 
dicto referent.  Literally translated, de dicto means “of what is 
said,” and the concomitant referent is a sort of definite descrip-
tion rather than an ostensible entity. That is, the de dicto sense 
of ‘her child’ refers to (3) the office of ‘her child’ and the sub-
ject who comes to fill that office, whoever that person might be. 
For example, there is an office of president of the United States. 
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Barack Obama currently fills this office and is the de re indi-
vidual referred to when I say “the president has two daughters.” 
However, when I say, “the president is commander in chief of 
the military,” I may be referring to the office of president and to 
whoever happens to fill it. 
A de dicto interpretation separates the office in question 
from the various particular, actual subjects who ultimately fill 
that office. De dicto reference tells us that there is an office 
of ‘her child’ or ‘my pet’ or ‘the president,’ but it also tells 
us that different individual children or pets or presidents could 
fill these offices. Context often determines whether the speaker 
means to refer in the de re or de dicto sense. But when consid-
ering a subject who might or might not exist at all, it is easy to 
conflate or ignore this distinction between the de re and de dicto 
senses. David Boonin, Caspar Hare, Rahul Kumar and others 
have touched on this important distinction (see Boonin 2008; 
Hare 2007; Parfit 2011; and Kumar 2003, for example). How-
ever, none has provided sufficient support for a commitment to 
and prioritization of the de dicto reading of non-identity cases – 
Boonin suggests that we still ought to bite the bullet and create 
beings with defects; Hare maintains that the de re individuals 
with lives worth living (who would not have existed otherwise) 
still have a personal complaint, which they clearly do not, giv-
en that their lives are worth living and the alternative for them 
is non-existence; and Kumar’s argument does not apply to non-
human animals due to his reliance on a contractualist require-
ment that the subjects be rational and self-governing. I move 
beyond these other, limited discussions of the distinction and 
provide positive reason to embrace de dicto reference, respon-
sibility, and the related harm in non-identity cases involving 
any being who qualifies as a member of the moral community. 
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With this distinction between de re and de dicto reference 
in mind, we are now equipped to supplement the comparative 
account of harm. To harm or benefit a subject in the de re sense 
is to make a particular individual worse or better off than she 
otherwise would have been. This is a standard appeal to the 
comparative account of harm. But the comparative account of 
harm has de dicto components in addition to de re ones. To 
harm or benefit in the de dicto sense is to fill the office with 
a moral subject who is worse or better off (respectively) than 
an office holder would have been—that is, in de dicto cases of 
harm or benefit, we can arrive at Welfare Determination before 
or without Identity Determination. 
For example, suppose I say, “I’m getting food for my dog.” 
I could mean this in one of two ways. I might mean to convey 
the de re sense of ‘my dog’ and thereby assert that I am the 
guardian of an individual dog, and I am buying that particular 
dog some food. On the other hand, I might mean to convey the 
de dicto sense of ‘my dog.’ Suppose I am about to go to the 
Humane Society to pick out a dog to take home, but I first stop 
by the pet store to pick up some dog food. At that point, when I 
say, “I’m getting food for my dog,” I do not have any particular 
dog in mind. However, I do know that some dog or other will 
fill the office of  ‘my dog,’ and I know that that dog will need 
food. If you did not know me, and you heard me utter the sen-
tence “I’m getting food for my dog,” you might assume I meant 
it in the de re sense, but this need not be the case. I could be on 
my way to the shelter. 
Now, suppose that, before I go to the shelter to select a dog, 
I put poison in the dog food with the intention of feeding it to 
my dog. Here I have affected the welfare of my dog before I 
determine the identity of my dog. No matter which dog comes 
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to fill the office of ‘my dog,’ I harm my dog as I put the poison 
food in the dish. Thus, as I poison the food, I harm my dog 
in the de dicto sense. This is also why Sarah harms her child 
when she refuses to take the pills. She fails to care adequately 
for the office of ‘her child’ by ensuring that the office holder—
whoever that will be—will enjoy lower welfare. Thus, she does 
something wrong in part because she commits a de dicto harm 
to her child. 
One might be tempted, at this moment, to point out that a de 
re dog is indeed de re harmed at some point in the poison sce-
nario, even if we do not know which dog is harmed at the time 
the poison is mixed into the food. However, nothing about my 
view prevents de re and de dicto harm from arising together or 
in succession; in fact, it is a virtue of my view that it allows for 
our commonsense intuitions regarding harm to particular, de re 
individuals. On this view, the comparative account of harm al-
lows for both de re and de dicto considerations. Thus, we need 
not abandon traditional de re harm, though we may still appeal 
to de dicto harm in cases where there is good reason to think 
carefully about how to fill or affect certain offices. Let us now 
turn to questions of de re versus de dicto harm surrounding 
the act of choosing or breeding a dog to become a pet.  This 
analysis will make clear the analogy between pet-specific non-
identity cases and traditional procreative non-identity cases.
First of all, it is important to note that, currently, any dog 
breeding harms many dogs in a strong de re sense. This is be-
cause too many dogs exist already—far more than can be ad-
equately cared for. There are more dogs now than there are of-
fices of ‘my pet’ that dogs can fill. Thus, intentionally creating 
more dogs—pedigreed or otherwise—is, in most cases, tanta-
mount to causing the premature death of as many shelter dogs 
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as we create (because euthanasia is the most common solution 
to dog overpopulation). Anyone who wants to adopt a dog and 
decides to fill the office of ‘my dog’ with a pet who was inten-
tionally bred (instead of a shelter pet) is essentially allowing 
the death a dog somewhere. There is one exception, though it 
is still arguably morally problematic. If someone is willing fill 
the office of ‘my dog’ only with a pedigreed dog, then there 
would be no potential for a shelter dog to fill this office. Re-
gardless, we may still question the moral integrity of someone 
who refuses to adopt a shelter dog, knowing the overpopula-
tion problems that currently exist. Almost all dog breeding—
pedigreed or otherwise—is harmful at this moment because it 
makes these actual, individual dogs worse off than they other-
wise would have been. This is a straightforward sense of de re 
harm to dogs—and we ought to take it very seriously. However, 
such harm is not the focus of this paper.
Suppose we suddenly fixed the overpopulation problem. 
Now all the dogs who currently exist have homes, and all the 
dogs who will exist will have homes. Have we fulfilled our 
responsibility to dogs, morally speaking? We have not, I argue, 
if we still maintain the practice of breeding of pedigreed dogs, 
because pedigreed dogs are on balance less healthy and less 
well off than mixed breed dogs. Given medical and veterinary 
advancements, we are now able to recognize breed predisposi-
tions and patterns of inheritance. These predispositions and pat-
terns lead to many troubling conditions borne by our pets. For 
example, progressive retinal atrophy (which causes blindness) 
is common in many dog breeds. Cardiomyopathy is common 
in Boxers. The long bodies and short legs of Bassett Hounds, 
Dachshunds and Corgis are actually the result of abnormal de-
velopment of cartilage. Painful disk herniation occurs for many 
members of these breeds at a young age. Hip Dysplasia is com-
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mon in Golden Retrievers, Rottweilers, and many large breed 
dogs. English Bull Dogs, Pugs, Boston Terriers, Pekingese, 
Cavalier King Charles Spaniels, Shar-peis, French Bulldogs, 
Lhasa Apsos, and Shih Tzus can all suffer from Brachycephalic 
Syndrome. This ailment is a direct result of breeding and hu-
man intervention because our selecting for the exaggerated fa-
cial features representative of these breeds has resulted in seri-
ous respiratory difficulties for members of these breeds. For ex-
ample, breed standards for the English Bulldog specify that the 
face should be very short, as should the distance between the 
tip of the nose and where it is set between the eyes. Of course, 
this leaves little room for the functions involved in breathing. 
These are just some of the many problems our pedigreed pets 
face as a result of lack of genetic variation and of genetic pat-
terns of inheritance (Dobson 2013; Gough & Thomas 2010.) 
Most of these problems, however, are not so severe that the 
dogs who suffer from them have lives that are worse than no 
existence at all. Many of our pedigreed dogs have lives that are 
overall worth living, and they would not exist at all without 
such predispositions because, in that case, the dogs in ques-
tion would be mixed breed dogs with utterly distinct genes and 
parentage. However, even though many pedigreed dogs are 
not de re harmed, we should not be tempted to find the prac-
tice of pedigreed dog breeding thereby morally acceptable. We 
must still consider the de dicto harm to our dogs. Just as Sarah 
wrongs her child in this more general sense by making it the 
case that whoever comes to be her child is far worse off than 
her child otherwise could have been, so too do we wrong our 
pets in general when we knowingly create dogs who will be far 
worse off than our dogs otherwise could have been. Of course, 
some pedigreed dogs do not exhibit these harmful traits at all 
and do not suffer from their genetic status. However, there is 
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still a very high risk that any given pedigreed dog will indeed 
be one who suffers from a breed predisposition, and we would 
not think Sarah’s actions any more acceptable if she had made 
it the case that there was a high risk (instead of a guarantee) of 
having a child with a serious birth defect when she could have 
had a healthy child. 
Furthermore, I wish to note that I am not here suggesting 
that de dicto harm is always relevant, or that it always trumps 
de re harm. Notice that we are not always beholden to all of-
fice holders or potential office holders. There are many cases in 
which de dicto harm obtains, and it is simply not morally rel-
evant. Suppose I spot a twenty-dollar bill lying on the sidewalk. 
No one is around, so I pick it up to spend later. By doing so, I 
have made it the case that all those who might have walked by 
after me and found the money are worse off than they other-
wise would have been, for they could have been twenty dollars 
richer. But this de dicto harm is not particularly relevant to the 
moral analysis of the situation. Similarly, suppose I’m eating 
at a diner, and I order a slice of pie. The server tells me I am in 
luck, because I have just ordered the last slice of pie. By eat-
ing the pie, I de dicto harm anyone else who might come into 
the diner wanting pie. Again, this harm does not seem morally 
relevant. So, what does make de dicto harm morally relevant?
There is a responsibility criterion that is necessary for gen-
erating moral obligations in cases of de dicto harm. This crite-
rion does not obtain in the case of the pie or the twenty-dollar 
bill because I bear no responsibility to satisfy the monetary or 
gustatory desires of those who come after me in those cases. 
This criterion does obtain, however, when we stand in a rec-
ognized responsibility-relation to an office that moral subjects 
are filling or will come to fill. That is to say, we often take on 
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roles as office caretakers, and more stringent moral standards 
ensue. When we decide to become parents, we have a strong re-
sponsibility to whoever our children turn out to be. Leaders and 
policy-makers have a strong responsibility to citizens, regard-
less of their individual identities. Teachers have a responsibility 
to benefit educationally anyone who becomes a student in their 
class. To fulfill one’s role as an office caretaker, one must take 
de dicto harm seriously. With this in mind, let us assess our role 
as caretakers for the office of ‘our pets.’
IV. Caring for Our Pets
I hold that dogs are moral subjects. That is, I assume that it 
matters morally how we treat them. So, what kinds of moral 
responsibility do we have to our dogs? I claim that two kinds 
of responsibility-relations obtain—the first is a general respon-
sibility and the other a more specific responsibility. Because 
humans themselves created the dependency on humans that 
canine pets now have, we are clearly responsible for the fact 
that they require our care. Thus, we qua humans have a gen-
eral responsibility to all dogs everywhere, and to whoever these 
dogs turn out to be. We also have more specific responsibilities 
to our individual pets, and each person who accepts the role 
of caretaker for the office of ‘my pet’ thereby incurs specific 
responsibilities. These responsibilities include avoiding both 
de re harm and, importantly, de dicto harm. We have strong 
obligations to care for our specific pets, but we also have strong 
moral reason to stop harming our pets in the de dicto sense and 
to cease pedigreed breeding insofar as it leads to significantly 
lower welfare.
For those who take this argument to heart, there are two 
things to keep in mind. The first is that the bulk of these welfare 
concerns stem from a lack of genetic variation. Since the vast 
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majority of breeding leads to precisely this state, I do wish to 
critique the practice of breeding as it currently stands. However, 
this does not rule out the possibility that reforming breed stan-
dards or practicing breeding such that we ultimately increased 
the general fitness of our pets could appropriately address these 
welfare-related concerns. In fact, further analysis might reveal 
that we are morally required to breed our pets to be as healthy 
as possible, if our medical and breeding capabilities surpass 
nature’s ability to produce healthy animals. Second, it is im-
portant to keep in mind that these concerns do not apply to 
currently existing pedigreed pets who have lives worth living. 
The de re benefits of love and care and good welfare that these 
pets enjoy matter precisely because these pets already exist.  I 
do not claim that your beloved pedigree pet should not exist. 
However, I do claim we should think carefully about how to 
improve the welfare of the animals we ultimately bring into 
existence, and we should take seriously our de dicto responsi-
bilities to those future animals.
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